

UNCLASSIFIED

K42

UNCLASSIFIED

PTO2511

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 JAKART 06779 01 OF 04 190245Z
ACTION SCT-00

INFO	LOG-00	MFA-00	NP-00	AID-00	CIAE-00	DODE-00	NOTE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-00	EB-00	FAAE-00	FBIE-00	UTED-00
	VC-00	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-00	VCE-00
	DCP-01	NSAE-00	DHS-00	IRM-00	TEST-00	USIE-00	IIP-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-00	DRL-02	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/004W
				-----0AD20E 190245Z /38			

P 190153Z NOV 02
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3034

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 006779

FOR S/CT/REAP AND EAP/IET

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER, PREL, PGOV, PINR, KJUS, ASEC, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA: 2002 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

REF: A. STATE 210772 (INSTRUCTIONS)
B. 01 JAKARTA 4445 (2001 TERRORISM REPORT)

1. THIS CABLE CONSTITUTES EMBASSY JAKARTA'S SUBMISSION FOR
THE 2002 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT (REF A). OUR SUBMISSION IS
KEYED TO THE HEADINGS IN REF A.

A. SUPPORT FOR GLOBAL COALITION AGAINST TERRORISM

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 06779 01 OF 04 190245Z

2. INDONESIA INCREASED ITS SUPPORT FOR THE GLOBAL COALITION
AGAINST TERRORISM DURING THIS PERIOD. PRIOR TO THE OCTOBER
TERRORIST BOMBINGS IN BALI, INDONESIA COOPERATED IN
APPREHENDING SEVERAL SUSPECTED AL-QAEDA OPERATIVES AND TOOK
LEGAL ACTION AGAINST SOME DOMESTIC EXTREMISTS. NEVERTHELESS,
INDONESIAN SUPPORT FOR THE GLOBAL ANTI-TERRORISM CAMPAIGN
REMAINED CIRCUMSCRIBED DURING THE FIRST NINE MONTHS OF THE
YEAR. THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT AGGRESSIVELY PURSUE TERRORIST
SUSPECTS OR POSSIBLE TERRORIST GROUPS, AND SOME GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS DENIED THAT THERE WERE ANY TERRORISTS OR TERRORIST
OPERATIONS WITHIN INDONESIA, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE
AL-QAEDA-LINKED JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH (JI) TERRORIST GROUP,
DESPITE MOUNTING EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

3. THE OCTOBER 12 BOMBINGS IN BALI KILLED OVER 190 PEOPLE, INCLUDING PROBABLY SEVEN AMERICANS AND MANY INDONESIANS. THEY SHOCKED THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PUBLIC, AND COST THE INDONESIAN ECONOMY MILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN LOST REVENUE. THESE ATTACKS BECAME A TURNING POINT IN THE GOVERNMENT'S COMMITMENT TO FIGHT TERRORISM. WITHIN WEEKS OF THE BOMBINGS, THE GOVERNMENT ISSUED TWO ANTI-TERRORISM DECREES FACILITATING THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF TERRORIST ACTS, AND TWO INSTRUCTIONS TO IMPROVE COUNTER-TERRORISM COORDINATION. IN NOVEMBER, THE GOVERNMENT FINALLY INTRODUCED DRAFT ANTI-TERRORISM BILLS IN THE LEGISLATURE.

4. THE GOVERNMENT LAUNCHED AN AGGRESSIVE INVESTIGATION INTO THE BALI BOMBINGS THAT, AS OF MID-NOVEMBER, IMPLICATED JI AND LED TO A NUMBER OF ARRESTS. THE POLICE ALSO ARRESTED WELL-KNOWN ISLAMIC HARD-LINER ABU BAKAR BA'ASYIR, LINKED BY INTERNATIONAL MEDIA AND OTHER REPORTS TO JI, FOR SUSPECTED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JAKART 06779 01 OF 04 190245Z
INVOLVEMENT IN PREVIOUS DOMESTIC TERRORIST INCIDENTS. THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUED EFFORTS TO PROSECUTE SEVERAL OTHER DOMESTIC EXTREMISTS. (SEE SECTION B.)

5. THE INDONESIAN MILITARY COOPERATED TO A LARGE EXTENT WITH FLIGHT CLEARANCE REQUESTS FROM THE U.S. AND OTHER COUNTRIES RELATED TO THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM LAST YEAR. THE INDONESIAN MILITARY ALSO HAS COOPERATED IN THE PROTECTION FROM TERRORISTS OF HIGH VALUE SHIPPING IN THE MALACCA STRAITS. OTHER THAN LIMITED MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT, THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES HAVE NOT PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF THE BALI BOMBINGS.

6. INDONESIA COMPLIES WITH UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS (UNSCRS) THAT BIND ALL UN MEMBER STATES TO FREEZE THE ASSETS OF INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS LISTED BY THE UN COUNTER-TERRORISM COMMITTEE. SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, INDONESIA HAS NOT DISCOVERED OR FROZEN ANY TERRORIST ASSETS. INDONESIA'S WEAK RULE OF LAW AND POORLY REGULATED FINANCIAL SYSTEM MAKE FINDING AND FREEZING TERRORIST ASSETS VERY DIFFICULT. HOWEVER, AFTER THE OCTOBER BALI ATTACKS, THE GOVERNMENT JOINED IN SUPPORTING THE UN'S DESIGNATION OF JI AS A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HAVE INDICATED THEIR INTENTION TO EXPEDITE THE PROCESS TO FREEZE TERRORIST ASSETS. AS OF NOVEMBER, HOWEVER, INDONESIA'S ASSET FREEZING PROCESS REMAINED VERY SLOW.

7. WHILE INDONESIA'S SUPPORT IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM INCREASED MARKEDLY, THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT FULLY UTILIZED THE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

LEGAL MECHANISMS AT ITS DISPOSAL TO COMBAT TERRORISM. IT HAS
NOT TAKEN ACTION AGAINST SOME SUSPECTED TERRORISTS NOR

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 JAKART 06779 01 OF 04 190245Z
AGGRESSIVELY INVESTIGATED CASES OUTSIDE OF THE BALI ATTACKS.
EVEN AFTER THE OCTOBER 12 BOMBINGS, SENIOR GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS AND SOME MUSLIM LEADERS OFTEN REMAINED HESITANT TO
PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGE THE POSSIBLE EXISTENCE OF JI WITHIN THE
COUNTRY, AND THE LINKS BETWEEN ITS CITIZENS, JI, AND
AL-QAEDA.

B. RESPONSE OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM

8. INDONESIA'S JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND THE POLICE CONDUCTED
INVESTIGATIONS OF THE BALI TERRORIST ATTACKS, DOMESTIC
TERRORISM AND VIOLENT EXTREMISTS, AND RELATED INCIDENTS.
INDONESIAN COURTS HAVE NOT YET CONVICTED ANY SUSPECTS IN
THESE CASES, AND THE MAJOR CASES HAD NOT YET CONCLUDED AT THE
TIME OF THIS REPORT.

9. THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL POLICE (INP) AND OTHER SECURITY
FORCES LAUNCHED AN AGGRESSIVE INVESTIGATION INTO THE OCTOBER
12 BALI ATTACKS. THE GOVERNMENT PERMITTED AN UNPRECEDENTED
JOINT INVESTIGATION WITH AUSTRALIA (MANY OF WHOSE NATIONALS
DIED IN THE ATTACK), ASSISTED BY THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED PTQ9498

PAGE 01 JAKART 06779 02 OF 04 190245Z
ACTION SCT-00

INFO	LOG-00	MFA-00	NP-00	AID-00	CIAE-00	DODE-00	DOTE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-00	EB-00	FAAE-00	FBIE-00	UTED-00
	VC-00	TEDE-00	INR-00	LAB-01	L-00	VCE-00	DCP-01
	NSAE-00	DHS-00	IRM-00	TEST-00	USIE-00	ASDS-00	IIP-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-00	DRL-02	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/004W

-----0AD227 190246Z /38

P 190153Z NOV 02
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3035

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 04 JAKARTA 006779

FOR S/CT/REAP AND EAP/IET

E.O. 12958: N/A

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

TAGS: PTER, PREL, PGOV, PINR, KJUS, ASEC, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA: 2002 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

COUNTRIES. IN NOVEMBER, INDONESIAN POLICE ARRESTED ONE SUSPECT, AMROZI, WHO REPORTEDLY CONFESSED TO INVOLVEMENT IN THE BALI TERRORIST ATTACKS. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, AMROZI ACKNOWLEDGED CONTACTS WITH JI LEADERS ABU BAKAR BA'ASYIR AND RIDUAN ISAMUDDIN (A.K.A. HAMBALI), THOUGH HE DID NOT SPECIFICALLY TIE THEM TO THE BALI ATTACKS. HE LATER IDENTIFIED JI MEMBER IMAM SAMUDRA AS THE CHIEF ORGANIZER OF THE BALI BOMBINGS. THE POLICE INVESTIGATION INTO THE BALI ATTACK IS ONGOING AT THE TIME OF THIS REPORT.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 06779 02 OF 04 190245Z

10. INDONESIAN POLICE ALSO ARRESTED WELL-KNOWN ISLAMIC HARD-LINER ABU BAKAR BA'ASYIR, KNOWN IN MEDIA AND REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS' REPORTS AS A JI LEADER, FOR SUSPECTED INVOLVEMENT IN PREVIOUS DOMESTIC TERRORIST INCIDENTS. THESE INCLUDE THE CHRISTMAS 2000 CHURCH BOMBINGS AND A REPORTED ASSASSINATION PLOT AGAINST PRESIDENT MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI (THEN VICE PRESIDENT). AS OF MID-NOVEMBER, POLICE HAVE NOT CHARGED BA'ASYIR WITH COMPLICITY IN THE BALI TERRORIST ATTACKS.

11. IN SEPARATE CASES, POLICE ARRESTED AND CHARGED TWO LEADERS OF MILITANT EXTREMIST GROUPS, JA'AFAR UMAR THALIB OF LASKAR JIHAD (LJ) FOR INCITING HATRED AND VIOLENCE, AND HABIB RIZIEQ OF THE ISLAM DEFENDERS FRONT (FPI) FOR DIRECTING ACTS OF VIOLENCE. POLICE LATER PLACED BOTH INDIVIDUALS UNDER HOUSE ARREST PENDING THE OUTCOME OF THEIR RESPECTIVE TRIALS.

12. INDONESIAN POLICE CONDUCTED A CREDIBLE FIRST PHASE OF INVESTIGATION INTO THE AUGUST 31 AMBUSH OF FREEPORT CONTRACT EMPLOYEES NEAR TEMBAGAPURA AND TIMIKA IN PAPUA PROVINCE, WHICH KILLED TWO AMERICANS AND ONE INDONESIAN AND WOUNDED TEN OTHERS. THE INVESTIGATION UNCOVERED INDICATIONS OF POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT BY INDONESIAN MILITARY MEMBERS. DUE TO LIMITS ON ITS LEGAL JURISDICTION, THE POLICE HANDED THE INVESTIGATION OVER TO MILITARY AUTHORITIES. MILITARY AUTHORITIES DISPATCHED AN INVESTIGATIVE TEAM TO PAPUA, BUT DID NOT ANNOUNCE ANY RESULTS AS OF MID-NOVEMBER.

13. THE POLICE INVESTIGATED THE SEPTEMBER 23 EXPLOSION OF A GRENADE NEAR A U.S. RESIDENCE IN JAKARTA. DESPITE MANY LEADS, THE POLICE INVESTIGATION DID NOT PROCEED AGGRESSIVELY.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JAKART 06779 02 OF 04 190245Z

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

BY EARLY NOVEMBER, THE POLICE ARRESTED THREE INDONESIAN SUSPECTS IN THIS CASE, BUT HAD NOT BROUGHT THEIR CASES TO TRIAL. INITIAL POLICE STATEMENTS DESCRIBED THE FAILED ATTACK AS DIRECTED AT U.S. DIPLOMATS, BUT SUBSEQUENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTS BY THE INP ATTEMPTED TO LINK THE GRENADE EXPLOSION TO A CRIMINAL DEBT COLLECTION.

C. EXTRADITION

14. THE GOI DID NOT EXTRADITE OR REQUEST THE EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS FOR PROSECUTION DURING THE YEAR. THE GOI REMOVED OMAR AL FAROUQ, A SUSPECTED TERRORIST WITH REPORTED LINKS TO AL-QAEDA, FROM INDONESIA IN JUNE AND HE IS CURRENTLY IN U.S. CUSTODY.

D. IMPEDIMENTS TO PROSECUTION AND EXTRADITION

15. THERE ARE NO SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BARRIERS TO PROSECUTING DOMESTIC TERROR ACTS UNDER THE EXISTING CRIMINAL CODE. THE GOVERNMENT'S ISSUANCE OF ANTI-TERRORISM REGULATIONS (PERPU) IN OCTOBER AND THE DRAFT ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION UNDER CONSIDERATION BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AS OF MID-NOVEMBER SPECIFICALLY ADDRESS INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. THE NEW REGULATIONS STRENGTHEN THE GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO HOLD AND PROSECUTE SUSPECTED TERRORISTS.

16. THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT PROHIBIT THE EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS. INDONESIA HAS EXTRADITION TREATIES WITH ONLY FIVE COUNTRIES (AUSTRALIA, MALAYSIA, PHILIPPINES, UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 JAKART 06779 02 OF 04 190245Z
SOUTH KOREA AND THAILAND) AND AN AGREEMENT FOR "SURRENDER OF FUGITIVE OFFENDERS" WITH THE SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION (SAR) OF HONG KONG. INDONESIA DOES NOT HAVE AN EXTRADITION TREATY WITH THE UNITED STATES.

E. OTHER GOVERNMENT RESPONSES

17. MANY SENIOR INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS CONDEMNED TERRORISM DURING THE YEAR. OFFICIALS PROVIDED CONFLICTING REMARKS ON THE PRESENCE OF TERRORISTS AND THEIR OPERATIONS IN THE COUNTRY, EVEN AFTER THE OCTOBER 12 ATTACKS. SOME DENIED THAT INDONESIANS WERE INVOLVED IN TERRORISM AND PUBLICLY STATED THAT JI DID NOT EXIST WITHIN INDONESIA, DESPITE EVIDENCE FROM REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS TO THE CONTRARY. FOLLOWING THE TERRORIST ATTACKS IN BALI AND INCREASING

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EVIDENCE OF JI'S INVOLVEMENT, THE DEFENSE MINISTER
ACKNOWLEDGED THAT GROUPS LINKED TO AL-QAEDA, SUCH AS JI,
OPERATE IN THE COUNTRY. OTHER OFFICIALS CONTRADICTED THE
DEFENSE MINISTER. IN MID-NOVEMBER INDONESIA'S FOREIGN
MINISTER PUBLICLY ADMITTED THAT JI CELLS EXIST IN INDONESIA.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PTO2512

PAGE 01 JAKART 06779 03 OF 04 190245Z
ACTION SCT-00

INFO	LOG-00	MFA-00	NP-00	AID-00	CIAE-00	DODE-00	NOTE-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-00	EB-00	FAAE-00	FBIE-00	UTED-00
	VC-00	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-00	VCE-00
	DCP-01	NSAE-00	DHS-00	IRM-00	TEST-00	USIE-00	IIP-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-00	DRL-02	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/004W

-----0AD23C 190245Z /38

P 190153Z NOV 02
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3036

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 04 JAKARTA 006779

FOR S/CT/REAP AND EAP/IET

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER, PREL, PGOV, PINR, KJUS, ASEC, ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA: 2002 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

F. MAJOR COUNTER-TERRORISM EFFORTS

18. INDONESIA'S RESPONSE TO THE OCTOBER 12 TERRORIST ATTACKS
IN BALI REPRESENTED A MAJOR AND MULTI-FACETED
COUNTER-TERRORISM EFFORT. IT INCLUDED THE QUICK ADOPTION OF
ANTI-TERRORISM DECREES (PERPU), THE INTRODUCTION INTO THE
LEGISLATURE OF A COUNTER-TERRORISM BILL, AND AN AGGRESSIVE
INVESTIGATION INTO THE BALI ATTACKS IN PARTICULAR. IN
ADDITION, THE GOVERNMENT STRENGTHENED THE INSTITUTIONAL BASIS

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 06779 03 OF 04 190245Z
FOR FIGHTING TERRORISM BY ISSUING PRESIDENTIAL INSTRUCTIONS
THAT CENTRALIZE CT OPERATIONS UNDER THE COORDINATING MINISTER
FOR POLITICAL AND SECURITY AFFAIRS, AND CENTRALIZE CT
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES UNDER THE HEAD OF THE NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (BIN). POLICE COUNTER-TERRORISM
CAPABILITIES REMAINED LIMITED. THE MILITARY MAINTAINED THE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

ONLY REAL FORCE CAPABLE OF RESPONDING TO POTENTIAL TERRORIST ACTIONS LIKE HIJACKING AND HOSTAGE-TAKING.

19. THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT IMMEDIATELY PUT TO USE ITS NEW COUNTER-TERRORISM POWERS AND ITS STRENGTHENED INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN THE AGGRESSIVE PURSUIT OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS. AS OF MID-NOVEMBER, THE GOVERNMENT'S INTENTION TO IMPLEMENT A WIDER COUNTER-TERRORISM EFFORT REMAINED UNPROVEN.

20. INDONESIA PARTICIPATED IN A NUMBER OF REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL FORA FOCUSED ON TERRORISM. IT SUPPORTED DECLARATIONS ON JOINT ACTION AGAINST TERRORISM AT THESE EVENTS. THESE INCLUDED THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM MEETING IN JULY, THE U.S.-SPONSORED SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTER-TERRORISM CONFERENCE IN AUGUST, AND THE ASEAN SUMMIT IN NOVEMBER. INDONESIA AND AUSTRALIA INTEND TO CO-SPONSOR A REGIONAL CONFERENCE ON COMBATING TERRORIST FINANCE IN DECEMBER.

G. SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

21. INDONESIA DID NOT PROVIDE DIPLOMATIC, POLITICAL OR FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO ANY TERRORIST GROUP OR ACTIVITY DURING THIS PERIOD.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JAKART 06779 03 OF 04 190245Z

H. STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF TERRORIST COUNTRIES

22. THE GOI DID NOT MAKE ANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF ANY STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM ON A TERRORISM-RELATED ISSUE.

I. CHANGE IN ATTITUDE

23. THE OCTOBER 12 BOMBINGS IN BALI, THE WORLD'S DEADLIEST TERRORIST ACTION SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, LED TO A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE AND PUBLIC OPINION, AND PRODUCED A GROWING OFFICIAL CONSENSUS ON THE NEED TO FIGHT GLOBAL TERRORISM. THE BROADENING CONSENSUS LED TO A FIRMER INSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR COOPERATION. GREATER UNDERSTANDING AND CONCERN ABOUT TERRORISM ALSO TOOK ROOT IN CIVIL SOCIETY AS A RESULT OF OCTOBER 12. NEVERTHELESS, SOME IMPORTANT POLITICAL AND CIVIL SOCIETY FIGURES CONTINUED TO CHALLENGE THE BASIS FOR ACTIONS AGAINST SUSPECTED TERRORISTS, CITING CONCERNS THAT SECURITY FORCES MIGHT USE THEIR NEW POWERS TO SUPPRESS RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION OR OTHERWISE VIOLATE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

HUMAN RIGHTS.

J. COUNTER-TERROR EFFORTS WITH THE U.S.

24. U.S.-INDONESIAN COUNTER-TERRORISM COOPERATION IMPROVED OVER THE PAST YEAR. PRIOR TO THE OCTOBER 12 TERRORIST ATTACKS IN BALI, INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES NETTED THREE SUSPECTED AL-QAEDA OPERATIVES AND SUPPORTED OTHER CT EFFORTS.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 JAKART 06779 03 OF 04 190245Z

HOWEVER, EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN CT COOPERATION CONTINUED TO BE HAMPERED BY DOMESTIC POLITICAL SENSITIVITIES, INCLUDING MISLEADING CLAIMS THAT THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM IS DIRECTED AGAINST MUSLIMS.

K. SPECIFIC COOPERATION WITH THE U.S.

25. THE USG CONTINUED TO PROVIDE A COMPREHENSIVE COUNTER-TERRORISM TRAINING PROGRAM FOR THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL POLICE. IN AUGUST OF THIS YEAR THE USG OFFERED AN ALL-INCLUSIVE COUNTER TERRORISM PROGRAM TO THE INP, WHICH THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT READILY ACCEPTED. A PROGRAM TO BE FUNDED BY ATA WILL TAKE PLACE IN COUNTRY AND WILL ASSIST THE INP IN BUILDING A COMPLETE CT UNIT WITHIN THE INP CONSISTING OF TRAINED INVESTIGATORS, FORENSICS CAPABILITIES AND A CRISIS RESPONSE TEAM. THE INP MADE AVAILABLE THEIR NEARBY POLICE TRAINING ACADEMY FOR THIS PROGRAM AND PROMISED FULL COOPERATION.

26. COUPLED WITH THE ATA PROGRAM, THE INP HAS TAKEN FULL ADVANTAGE OF TRAINING PROVIDED BY THE INTERNATIONAL LAW

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED PTO2514

PAGE 01 JAKART 06779 04 OF 04 190246Z

ACTION SCT-00

INFO	LOG-00	MFA-00	NP-00	AID-00	CIAE-00	DODE-00	DOTD-00
	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-00	EB-00	FAAE-00	FBIE-00	UTED-00
	VC-00	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-00	VCE-00
	DCP-01	NSAE-00	DHS-00	IRM-00	TEST-00	USIE-00	IIP-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-00	DRL-02	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/004W

-----0AD246 190246Z /38

P 190153Z NOV 02
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3037

UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 04 JAKARTA 006779

FOR S/CT/REAP AND EAP/IET

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PTER, PREL, PGOV, PINR, KJUS, ASEC, ID

SUBJECT: INDONESIA: 2002 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

ENFORCEMENT ACADEMY (ILEA) IN BANGKOK, THAILAND. THE INP PARTICIPATED IN 17 SPECIALIZED ILEA COURSE OFFERINGS DURING THIS REPORTING PERIOD.

27. THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT UTILIZED U.S.-SUPPORTED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE DRAFTING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING LEGISLATION. THE U.S. AND OTHER DONORS ALSO WORKED WITH THE GOI TO SET UP THE FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNIT CALLED FOR IN THE LAW.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JAKART 06779 04 OF 04 190246Z

28. A WELL-FUNDED, FULLY SUBSCRIBED POLICE TRAINING PROGRAM CONTINUED WITH SUPPORT FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE' INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE TRAINING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (ICITAP). THIS PROGRAM HAS FOCUSED ON CIVIL DISTURBANCE MANAGEMENT, CHANGE MANAGEMENT AND PROFESSIONAL POLICING IN A DEMOCRACY.

-- (K.1) COOPERATION WITH U.S. TO APPREHEND, CONVICT AND PUNISH TERRORISTS

29. THE GOVERNMENT SUCCESSFULLY COOPERATED WITH THE U.S. IN SEVERAL CASES CONNECTED WITH THE AL-QAEDA AND JI TERRORIST NETWORKS. THE COOPERATION INCLUDED OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, THE INP AND THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (BIN), AND SUCCESSFULLY RESULTED IN THE APPREHENSION OF THREE INDIVIDUALS CONNECTED WITH INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. THE ARREST OF ONE OF THE BALI BOMBERS ALSO DEMONSTRATED FURTHER RESULTS OF POLICE COOPERATION OTHER INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN THE WAR ON TERROR.

-- (K.2) COOPERATION TO PREVENT FUTURE ACTS OF TERRORISM AGAINST U.S. CITIZENS

30. ON SEPTEMBER 9, THE EMBASSY RECEIVED INFORMATION ABOUT A CREDIBLE AND SPECIFIC THREAT DIRECTED AGAINST THE U.S. MISSION IN INDONESIA. WORKING IN CLOSE COOPERATION WITH THE REGIONAL SECURITY OFFICE, THE INP TOOK ACTIVE MEASURES TO

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PROTECT THE U.S. MISSION AND OTHER OFF-SITE FACILITIES INCLUDING POSTING ADDITIONAL ARMED OFFICERS IN FRONT OF EMBASSY AND CONSULATE, AND CLOSING TRAFFIC LANES TO TO VEHICULAR TRAFFIC.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JAKART 06779 04 OF 04 190246Z

31. DURING THIS PERIOD, THE INP ALSO BEGAN TO INVESTIGATE AND ARREST LEADERS OF MILITANT EXTREMIST GROUPS, SOME OF WHOM HAVE THREATENED AMERICAN PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES IN INDONESIA.

L. COOPERATION IN PREVENTING TERRORIST ACTS
AGAINST U.S. CITIZENS

32. THE POLICE PROVIDED MORE EFFECTIVE SECURITY SUPPORT FOR THE EMBASSY AND U.S. CONSULATE GENERAL IN SURABAYA BEGINNING IN SEPTEMBER IN THE CONTEXT OF HEIGHTENED SECURITY CONCERNS RESULTING FROM SPECIFIC THREAT INFORMATION AND LATER A SEPTEMBER 23 GRENADE EXPLOSION NEAR A U.S. GOVERNMENT-OWNED RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY IN JAKARTA. THIS ALREADY HIGH LEVEL OF SUPPORT INCREASED FOLLOWING THE OCTOBER 12 TERRORIST BOMBINGS IN BALI. INDONESIAN POLICE ALSO INCREASED PROTECTION OF OTHER FACILITIES FREQUENTED BY U.S. CITIZENS, INCLUDING INTERNATIONAL SCHOOLS AND MAJOR INVESTMENT PROJECTS. THE INP THUS FAR HAS NOT FOLLOWED THROUGH, HOWEVER, ON EMBASSY REQUESTS TO AUGMENT SECURITY AT U.S. OFFICIAL RESIDENCES FOLLOWING THE SEPTEMBER 23 GRENADE INCIDENT AND THE BOMBINGS IN BALI.
BOYCE

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

UNCLASSIFIED